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Cover Page Footnote
1. Privacy International (PI) is a human rights group formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance and
privacy invasions by governments and corporations. PI is based in London, England, and has an office in
Washington, D.C. PI has conducted campaigns and research throughout the world on issues ranging from
wiretapping and national security, to ID cards, video surveillance, data matching, medical privacy, and
freedom of information and expression. Available at http://www.privacyinternational.org/
article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-65428 (17 August 2007). 2. a) The Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (CoE Convention);
and b) the 1981 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines Governing
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data. 3. Nedbank (one of the big five
banks in South Africa) has accordingly been forced, in the absence of such legislation locally which would
have facilitated the bank processing information within South Africa, at great extra cost, to set up
processing centres in Europe, in order to meet European information protection legislative requirements.
This has resulted in the effective cost to market of the bank's outsourcing service being driven up and
could very well be the reason for preventing the bank from obtaining further business processing
outsourcing deals within Europe on the basis of not being cost competitive enough. (Comments on
SALRC draft proposal) 4. Art 25(1) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995. Also refer to Art 29 Working Party’s Preparation of a methodology for evaluating the
adequacy of the level of protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. (Annex
to the Annual Report 1998 (XV D/5047/98) of the working party established by Article 29 of Directive 95/
46/EC.) 5. Act No. 54 of 2002. View www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a54-02.pdf (12 August 2007) 6.
Art 50(2) ECT Act. 7. SALRC Discussion papers available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm (07
August 2007) 8. These countries include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Kingdom of Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. For further information, see http://www.sadc.int/home.php (24 August 2007) 9.
See http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (24 August 2007) for a detailed discussion on the safe harbour
agreement. 10. Ibid note 85. 11. The objectives of SADC as stated in Article 5 of the Treaty are to: Achieve
development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the
people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; Evolve
common political values, systems and institutions; Promote and defend peace and security; Promote selfsustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member
States; Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; Promote
and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the Region; Achieve sustainable
utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; Strengthen and consolidate
the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the Region. 12.
Their article titled “Data Protection: Safeguarding Privacy in a New Age of Technology” can be viewed at:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/lm16.cfm (26 August 2007) 13. Lessig, Lawrence
in “Code and other Laws of Cyberspace”, Reidenberg, Joel R. in “Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology”, Texas Law Review, University of Texas at Austin School of
Law Publications, 76 (3) 1998 pp. 553-584, Rotenberg, Marc in “Fair Information Practices and the
Architecture of Privacy” (What Larry Doesn’t Get), Stanford Technology Law Review, Cite as: 2001 Stan.
Tech. L. Rev. 1 http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLR_1 (22 August 2007) 14. Bennett CJ “The
Protection of Personal Financial Information: An Evaluation of the Privacy Codes of the Canadian Bankers
Association and the Canadian Standards Association” Prepared for the “Voluntary Codes Project” of the
Office of Consumer Affairs Industry, Canada and Regulatory Affairs Treasury Board, March 1997 available
at http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/bennett/ 15. See Part VI of the New Zealand Privacy Act. 16. Comments on
SALRC draft proposal by Michalsons. 17. A good example of a code of conduct that incorporates all the

information protection principles was the 1996 Canadian Bankers Association Privacy Model Code. See
discussion at http://web.uvic.ca/~polisci/bennett/research/cba.htm. (06 August 2007) 18. A further
example of a code of conduct that set out obligations that, overall, are the equivalent of all the obligations
set out in those principles is the Netherlands Code of Conduct for the Processing of Personal Data by
Financial Institutions. 19. Project 124, October 2005, Privacy and Data Protection. 20. See Part IIIA of the
Australian Privacy Act 1988 as amended. 21. See for instance Unitas v Van Wyk & Naude case nr 231/
2005. Sec 50 – meaning of “required” for exercise or protection of right – when available to compel preaction production. The threshold of “required” was set very high due to uncertainty on whether to use the
Promotion to Access of Information Act (PAIA). PAIA was not the appropriate remedy. Discovery would
probably have been successful in this delictual action.
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Privacy International1 made the following statement regarding South Africa’s
financial sector in its 2005 world survey:
“South Africa has a well-developed financial system and banking
infrastructure. Despite the sophistication of the financial sector,
the privacy of financial information is weakly regulated by a
code of conduct for banks issued by the Banking Council.”
This extract highlights some of the problems South Africa are experiencing with
its current status on privacy as viewed from an International perspective. In recent
years the International society has stepped up its efforts in creating a global
village wherein the individual could be assured of having his/her privacy
protected. Various conventions and guidelines2 have previously laid the
foundation for privacy but it was not until the European Union’s (EU) launch of
its Directive on Data Protection in 1995 that we have seen a real coerced shift in
the focus of such protection. Cross border data transfers from the EU became
something of the past unless third countries (those countries outside the EU) could
prove the existence of adequate data protection provisions. It seemed to a big
extend that international trade would be hampered and some of its biggest trading
partners, such as the US, suddenly felt the impact due to its lagging protection
measures. In order to curtail such inadequacies, a Safe Harbor Agreement was
entered into between the EU and US whereby cross border data flow would be
allowed under certain prerequisites. This Agreement however, does not cover
Financial Institutions.
Concomitantly, South Africa, having the EU as its biggest trading partner also felt
the grunt and some SA organizations had to take its processing to within the
1

Privacy International (PI) is a human rights group formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance
and privacy invasions by governments and corporations. PI is based in London, England, and has
an office in Washington, D.C. PI has conducted campaigns and research throughout the world on
issues ranging from wiretapping and national security, to ID cards, video surveillance, data
matching, medical privacy, and freedom of information and expression. Available at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-65428 (17 August 2007).
2
a) The Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (CoE Convention); and
b) the 1981 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data.

43

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(4)
borders of the EU.3 By implication it was then assumed that South Africa lacked
the adequacy criteria as laid down by the EU Directive on Data Protection.4 The
South African Law Reform Commission (hereinafter referred to as SALRC)
instructed a project committee to work on a draft Bill on Protection of Personal
Information (hereinafter referred to as POPIA).
Some of the reasons why, can best be explained as Prof Iain Currie reflects in his
summary of the proposed POPIA:
“South Africa has general privacy protection in the Bill of Rights
[s 14]. The right is protected by a private law action to interdict
current or anticipated privacy infringements or to recover
damages for infringements that have already occurred. Though
information privacy is encompassed in the constitutional
protection of privacy, there is no specific legislative regulatory
regime for this aspect of privacy. The Promotion of Access to
Information Act 5protects personal information from disclosure
in response to a request made in terms of the Act, but has no
application outside the context of such a request. It is this
absence of legislation that the SALRC draft Bill intends to
remedy.”
Although there is current legislation in place, none are specifically formulated to
address data protection. For instance, The Electronic and Communication
Transaction (ECT) Act of 20026 also addresses the collection of personal
information in its chapter 8 but subscription to such principles is voluntary. The
Regulation of Interception of Communications (RIC) Act prohibits the
interception of communications while one Act that has recently been enacted, The
National Credit Act, makes specific provision for the regulation of personal
information, although such regulation is restricted to the financial sector.
Should the POPIA be enacted, consequential amendments may be necessary in
3

Nedbank (one of the big five banks in South Africa) has accordingly been forced, in the absence
of such legislation locally which would have facilitated the bank processing information within
South Africa, at great extra cost, to set up processing centres in Europe, in order to meet
European information protection legislative requirements. This has resulted in the effective cost to
market of the bank's outsourcing service being driven up and could very well be the reason for
preventing the bank from obtaining further business processing outsourcing deals within Europe
on the basis of not being cost competitive enough. (Comments on SALRC draft proposal)
4
Art 25(1) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995.
Also refer to Art 29 Working Party’s Preparation of a methodology for evaluating the adequacy of
the level of protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. (Annex to the
Annual Report 1998 (XV D/5047/98) of the working party established by Article 29 of Directive
95/46/EC.)
5
Act No. 54 of 2002. View www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a54-02.pdf (12 August 2007)
6

Art 50(2) ECT Act.
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respect of the following acts: Banking Act 38 of 1942, Broadcasting Act 4 of
1999, Copyright Act 98 of 1978, Electoral Act 73 of 1998, Financial Advisory
and Intermediary Services Act (FAIS) 37 of 2002, Financial Intelligence Centre
Act (FICA) 38 of 2001, Regulation of Interception of Communications and
Provision of Communications Related Information Act 70 of 2002, Short-term
Insurance Act 53 of 1998, Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and
Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996.7 Subsequently, the Electronic
Communications Act of 2005 might also be subject to amendments.
A survey of access to information laws and practices in 14 countries was done by
the Open Society Initiative and published in its Justice in Action Series, tilted,
Transparency and Silence. They had the following to say about South Africa:
“South Africa, the only monitored country in Africa with a
freedom of information law in place, demonstrated greater
compliance with the right to information than the other four
African countries. However, only 19 percent of the requests
submitted in South Africa yielded a compliant outcome and only
13 percent yielded information. This is by far the lowest score of
the seven monitored countries with freedom of information laws.
Justice Initiative monitoring exercises in both 2003 and 2004
highlighted serious problems with the implementation of South
Africa’s Promotion to Access of Information Act (Act No. 2 of 2
February 2000), and these problems resulted in high levels of
mute refusals in response to requests. Although the law is strong
on paper, it has proved complex to implement in practise, and
there have not been sufficient efforts to make its implementation
a priority. Better implementation might yet make it a model for
the region.”
Clearly this is the last sort of comment that South Africa needs on the
implementation of its proposed POPIA. Currently, as the draft stands, it is
however not unforeseeable that such comment might well be read into its
implementation, since some of its provisions might also prove too complex to
implement in practise, especially seen from the banking industry’s perspective.
Some of the issues are for instance the cross border data transfer problems related
to payment orders. Other problems are those concerning fraud, Basel II and the
legally non-binding codes of conduct that is currently laying the guidelines for
banking practices with regards to its consumers.
The question would be whether there is a golden one rule solution. I sincerely
doubt this. It is my contention that an array of various factors must play a role in
seeing the proposed POPIA through to its successful implementation. Such
factors would include safe harbour agreements, technological solutions, and
7

SALRC Discussion papers available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm (07 August 2007)
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sector specific regulations in the form of privacy code of conducts.
For South African banks for instance to operate successfully in Africa,
specifically in the SADC region (SADC stands for ‘Southern African
Development and Economic Community’ and refers to 14 African nations8 in
Southern Africa, who have signed a mutual trade and co-operation agreement) it
is my suggestion that South Africa sign a safe harbour agreement9 with the other
members of SADEC, similar to that as between the USA and the EU, but with the
exception that it also makes provision for financial institutions,. None of theses
countries10 currently make provision for data protection in its laws. Without such
an agreement, banks for instance might be strained along in subjecting themselves
to unnecessarily high costs in it’s strive to comply with the proposed POPIA. In
signing such an agreement however, time limits must be set on these countries to
implement similar legislation, encouraging them to step up its own democratic
values in ensuring sufficient privacy measures and achieving the objectives and
vision as set by SADC.11 This would then set a standard for the rest of Africa and
hopefully spirit them on to reach similar goals.
It is also suggested that similar safe harbour agreements must be concluded
between South Africa and some of its other trading partners. Some of these major
trading partners include the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, and Japan, although it would only be foreseen that such an agreement be
reached between South Africa and the United States, since the other five do make
provision for adequate measures.
Technological advances also have a role to play. Paul Rosenzweig and Alane
Kochems12 explain that technology is both a problem and a solution for the issues
posed by enhanced information collection systems. It can facilitate access to and
the accumulation of large amounts of data; however, if that access is not properly
8

These countries include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Kingdom of Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For further information, see http://www.sadc.int/home.php (24
August 2007)
9
See http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (24 August 2007) for a detailed discussion on the safe
harbour agreement.
10
Ibid note 85.
11
The objectives of SADC as stated in Article 5 of the Treaty are to: Achieve development and
economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of
Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; Evolve
common political values, systems and institutions; Promote and defend peace and security;
Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the
interdependence of Member States; Achieve complementarity between national and regional
strategies and programmes; Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of
resources of the Region; Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective
protection of the environment; Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and
cultural affinities and links among the people of the Region.
12
Their article titled “Data Protection: Safeguarding Privacy in a New Age of Technology” can be
viewed at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/lm16.cfm (26 August 2007)
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managed, the information can be misused. When designed with proper procedures
and protections and combined with oversight, technology can provide a
reasonable balance between security and privacy. They continue by stating that in
properly determining how best to enhance both liberty and security, it is useful to
have some basic principles for assessing data protection technologies. They
contend that such a list might include the following:


The data protection technology should allow for clear audit tracks to
prevent data alteration or identify when data have been changed.



The technology should have a means to provide graduated levels of
access to the data.



The technology should have protocols for enforcing the confidentiality
and security of the data.

There are multiple approaches to securing data. One means is following one of
the many published information security standards; another is to protect the most
sensitive data through encryption. They conclude by stating that controlling
access to data and making sure that entities only have the appropriate level of
access is critical if privacy interests are to be protected. Various software
companies have adapted its data collection programs to make provision for
legislation. A number of academic writers13 are also of the point of view that the
solution would be in the code and that lex informatica could be a useful policy
device. But this is a discussion in its own right. The fact that technology would
and in fact must play a role is unmistakable and its contributory role in the
banking industry could provide solutions to successful implementation of the
proposed POPIA.
The last and probably most crucial factor is the facilitation of sector based codes
of conduct. Codes offer flexibility and can be adapted to the specific economic,
technological and regulatory contexts of different sectors. With or without
legislation, codes will continue to be significant instruments by which
organisational responsibilities are defined, employee obligations are
communicated and citizen rights are established.14
In New Zealand, the approach is that codes of practice under its Privacy Act have
the force of law. A breach of a ratified code of practice is as serious as a breach of
13

Lessig, Lawrence in “Code and other Laws of Cyberspace”, Reidenberg, Joel R. in “Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology”, Texas Law
Review, University of Texas at Austin School of Law Publications, 76 (3) 1998 pp. 553-584,
Rotenberg, Marc in “Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy” (What Larry
Doesn’t Get), Stanford Technology Law Review, Cite as: 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLR_1 (22 August 2007)
14
Bennett CJ “The Protection of Personal Financial Information: An Evaluation of the Privacy
Codes of the Canadian Bankers Association and the Canadian Standards Association” Prepared
for the “Voluntary Codes Project” of the Office of Consumer Affairs Industry, Canada and
Regulatory Affairs Treasury Board, March 1997 available at http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/bennett/
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the information privacy principles expressed in the law, which would then trigger
the complaints and enforcement procedures in the legislation.15 Although the
Dutch system is similar in most respects to that in New Zealand, the codes are not
formally binding on the courts. The proposed POPIA makes provision for codes
in its section 62 to be legally binding.
In Australia an organisation or industry registering a Privacy Code under the
Australian Privacy Act, must prove and be legally accountable for the Code
providing at least the same level of protection that the ten National Privacy
Principles of the Australian Privacy Act require – preferably more.16
If the proposed POPIA is to follow a co-regulatory scheme as is proposed by the
SALRC, then the question has to be asked whether the current industry codes of
practice will suffice.
In terms of Section 54(2) (a) of the proposed POPIA, a code of conduct must
incorporate all the information protection principles17 or set out obligations that,
overall, are the equivalent of all the obligations set out in those principles18.
It is generally recognised that five kinds of privacy code can be identified
according to their scope of application: organisational code, the sector code, the
functional code, the professional code and the technological code.19
The approach envisaged by the proposed POPIA seems to be on par with the coregulatory scheme of Australia where any business or profession may develop a
Code of Practice. The code must then be submitted to the Privacy Commissioner
for approval. If the Code is deemed to be acceptable then the Commissioner may
issue it.20
The solution does not necessarily arrive with the issuing of the codes themselves,
but rather through a pre-emptive strike and pro-active based effort on behalf of the
specific sectors to submit such codes to the Commissioner. If industries sit back
and wait for the Commissioner to issue these codes, problems might arise as to
the interim position on the implementation and interpretation of the proposed
POPIA. Having regard to the specific related problems that might arise from an
industry’s perspective, courts could create precedents21, which in the absence of
15

See Part VI of the New Zealand Privacy Act.
Comments on SALRC draft proposal by Michalsons.
17
A good example of a code of conduct that incorporates all the information protection principles
was the 1996 Canadian Bankers Association Privacy Model Code. See discussion at
http://web.uvic.ca/~polisci/bennett/research/cba.htm. (06 August 2007)
18
A further example of a code of conduct that set out obligations that, overall, are the equivalent of
all the obligations set out in those principles is the Netherlands Code of Conduct for the
Processing of Personal Data by Financial Institutions.
19
Project 124, October 2005, Privacy and Data Protection.
20
See Part IIIA of the Australian Privacy Act 1988 as amended.
21
See for instance Unitas v Van Wyk & Naude case nr 231/2005. Sec 50 – meaning of “required”
for exercise or protection of right – when available to compel pre-action production. The threshold
of “required” was set very high due to uncertainty on whether to use the Promotion to Access of
16
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such co-regulatory structures, could be detrimental to the industry as a whole.
With its sector based knowledge, it is therefore suggested that the various
industries, make sure that they have these codes of conduct or privacy codes ready
for submission when the proposed POPIA becomes enacted, thereby annihilating
any room for an uncertain interim period that might be subject to scrutiny.

Information Act (PAIA). PAIA was not the appropriate remedy. Discovery would probably have
been successful in this delictual action.
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